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Human Rights Treaty Drafting through the Lens of Mental Disability:  




* LL.M. Candidate, New York University School of Law (2004); of the Ontario Bar; member of the Rehabilitation 
International NGO delegation to the United Nations Working Group Meeting respecting the proposed International 
Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, United Nations 
Headquarters, New York (January 5 - 16, 2004).  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Center for 
Human Rights and Global Justice’s “Emerging Human Rights Scholarship Conference”, New York University 
School of Law (October 31, 2003) where I benefited from the commentary of my colleagues. I owe particular thanks 
to Philip Alston, Gerard Quinn and Mercedes Perez.  The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect 
the position of Rehabilitation International.
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These are the most devalued, disenfranchised people that you can imagine…[t]hey are so 
out of sight, so out of mind, so devoid of rights, really.  Who cares about them anyway?1
- Ron Honberg, Director of Legal Affairs for the National Alliance of the Mentally Ill
I. Introduction
In December 2001, the Mexican government put forward Resolution 56/168 in the United 
Nations (“UN”) General Assembly (“GA”).2  The resolution called for consideration of a Convention on 
the human rights of persons with disabilities and further sought the immediate formation of an Ad-Hoc 
Committee (“Committee”).  This Committee would “consider proposals for a comprehensive and integral 
international convention to protect and promote the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities”.3
Resolution 56/168 was passed without any vote.  The Committee held its first session at UN Headquarters 
in New York from July 29 to August 9, 2002.  In its initial report to the UN GA, the Committee
recommended the adoption of a resolution that would, inter alia, invite “regional commissions and inter-
governmental organisations, as well as nongovernmental organisations to make available to the Ad Hoc 
Committee suggestions and possible elements, to be considered in proposals for a Convention”.4  The GA 
subsequently passed Resolution 56/510, respecting the accreditation and participation of non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”) in the Committee,5 and Decision 56/474, which “requests the 
1 Eric M. Weiss,  A Nationwide Pattern of Death, The Hartford Courant (Oct. 11, 1998), available at  
http://www.copaa.com/newstand/day1.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2003).
2 Comprehensive and integral international convention to promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with 
disabilities, G.A. Res. 168, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 119(b), U.N. Doc A/RES/56/168 (2001).
3 Id.  Resolution 56/168 followed on the heels of the first world NGO Summit on Disability in March 2000.  The 
resulting Beijing Declaration of Rights of People with Disability in the New Century strongly advocated for a 
disability-specific convention “to promote and protect the rights of people with disabilities, and enhance equal 
opportunities for participation in mainstream society”.  See Article 6 of the BEIJING DECLARATION ON THE 
RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN THE NEW CENTURY, adopted March 12, 2000 at the World 
NGO Summit on Disability, available at http://www.unescap.org/decade/beijdeclarfin.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 
2003).  
4 REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON A COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRAL INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTION ON PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES, at para. 16(7), U.N. Doc. A/57/357 (2002), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/adhoca57357e.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
5 Accreditation and participation of non-governmental organizations in the Ad Hoc Committee established to 
consider proposals for a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention to Promote and Protect the Rights 
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Secretary-General to make, as needed and within existing resources, reasonable efforts to facilitate the 
participation by persons with disabilities in the meetings and deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee…”6
The second session of the Committee took place again in New York from June 16 to 27, 2003 and 
was marked by a significant increase in the participation of disability-related NGOs.  Participating NGOs 
formed a caucus, called the International Disability Convention Caucus (“IDCC”).  The IDCC elected a 
15-member steering committee, consisting of seven members from International Disability Alliance 
(“IDA”) groups, five regional representatives, and one representative from each of the Center for 
International Rehabilitation, the Landmine Survivors Network, and other non-disability related NGOs.  
The session ended with a decision to form a 40 member Working Group, comprised of 27 representatives 
from Member States, 12 NGO representatives and one representative from a National Human Rights 
Institution.7  The Working Group met from January 5 to 16, 2004 for one session of ten working days to 
prepare a first draft of a Convention for consideration at the third session of the Committee in May 2004.8
The GA’s decision to pursue a Disability Rights Convention has been enthusiastically welcomed 
by the disability-related NGO community.9  Indeed, while the development of contemporary international 
human rights law since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights has advanced the interests of a 
number of marginalized, equality-seeking groups, it has simultaneously neglected the rights of persons 
and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 56/510, U.N. GAOR, 109th plenary meeting, 56th Sess., Agenda 
Items 8, 119(b), U.N. Doc A/RES/56/510 (2002).  
6 Participation of persons with disabilities in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International
Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Decision 
56/474, 56th session, Agenda items 8 and 119 (b), contained in A/56/49 Vol. III, (2002). 
7 REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON A COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRAL INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTION ON PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES, at para. 15(1), (2), U.N. Doc. A/58/118 & Corr.1 (2003), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/a_58_118_e.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2003).
8 Id. at para. 15(4).  The 12 NGO representatives on the Working Group include one representative from each of the 
seven IDA organizations, and one representative from each of the five distinct geographic regions identified by the 
IDCC members (Asia-Pacific, Africa, the Americas, West Africa and Europe). 
9 While remaining mindful, of course, that the GA “has not yet endorsed the need for a human rights instrument…”  
See Eric Rosenthal & Clarence J. Sundram, Recognizing Existing Rights and Crafting New Ones: Tools for Drafting 
Human Rights Instruments for People with Mental Disabilities, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH 
INTELLECTUAL DISABILTIES 467, 468 (Stanley S. Herr, Lawrence O. Gostin and Harold Hongju Koh, eds., 
2003). 
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with disabilities.  In particular, it has neglected those who are arguably the most vulnerable to powerful, 
legalized coercion:  persons diagnosed with mental disabilities.10
In this article, I explore whether, if established, such a Convention will in fact be an effective way 
to limit abuses of the rights of those diagnosed with metal disabilities.  This analysis is informed by 
attempts to use international law to improve the rights of the mentally disabled.  In Section II, I discuss 
the failure of international human rights law to effectively address these abuses to date.  In Section III, I 
consider the debate surrounding the need for a disability-specific Convention.  In Section IV, I argue that 
in order for the proposed Convention to be effective, and not simply a hollow mechanism, it must reject 
the traditional medical model of disability.  Instead, the Convention should reflect a rights-based 
paradigm premised on a reformulation of "disability" as a social construct.  To conclude, I discuss some 
of the principal issues facing the drafters relating to mental disability, including equality and non-
discrimination, the right to physical and psychological integrity and monitoring.  Drawing on my 
experience as a member of an NGO Delegation to the Working Group Meeting, I argue that NGO 
submissions pertaining to mental disability failed in helping to shape the normative content of broad 
statements of rights that are likely to be included in the final text of the proposed Convention.  In an 
attempt to fill this gap, I make particular recommendations that I hope will assist the proposed 
Convention to realize its full potential.  
II. The Shortcomings of International Human Rights Law with respect to Mental Disability
International law has made significant advances in protecting the rights of racial minorities,11
10 As discussed by Rosenthal and Sundram, “many people are subject to discrimination based upon the improper 
perception that they have a current or past mental disorder”.  Thus, the term "mental disabilities" should be read 
liberally, to encompass those diagnosed with a mental disability and those “perceived as such by medical authorities 
or others.”  See Eric Rosenthal & Clarence J. Sundram, International Human Rights In Mental Health Legislation, 
21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 469, footnote 2 (2002). 
11 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered 
into force Jan. 4, 1969 [hereinafter CERD].
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women,12 children13 and migrant workers.14  In stark contrast, not only is there currently no international 
treaty that specifically guarantees the rights of those with disabilities (mental or otherwise), but the desire 
to codify such protections has been virtually non-existent.  Attempts to address the issue of a Disability 
Rights Convention in a meaningful way by Italy at the forty-second session of the GA in 1987,15 and 
Sweden at the forty-fourth session in 1988,16 were both thwarted by the GA.  This international 
ambivalence towards the plight of mentally disabled persons is not surprising given a shameful history of 
severe human rights abuses.  Degrading living conditions, coerced “treatment”, scientific 
experimentation, seclusion, restraints - the list of violations to the dignity and autonomy of those 
diagnosed with mental disabilities is both long and egregious:
Human rights law and advocacy largely failed to offer any significant protection to the 
mentally ill in the decades following the Second World War.  Thus, there occurred:
(a) abusive medical experiments on mental patients in institutions;
(b) gross overcrowding and abuse of physical constraints in US mental hospitals in the 
1950s and early 1960s;
(c) the abusive treatment of patients and denial of basic civil rights of patients in Japanese 
private mental hospitals in the 1970s and 1980s; 
(d) the long-term neglect and failure to provide adequate treatment in the colonies for 
mentally ill and retarded on the Greek island of Leros;
(e) the widespread use of jails for the mentally ill in India…;
(f) neglect on a massive scale in the psychiatric institutions of the former Soviet bloc
(recent revelations about conditions in Hungary, Belarus, the Central Asian Republics as 
well as the Russian Federation itself);
(g) the plight of the destitute and homeless mentally ill who have been `de-
institutionalised' in the United States and several western European countries.17
12 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 
46) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981 [hereinafter CEDAW].
13 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. 
A/44/49, entered into force Sept. 2, 1990.
14 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 
G.A. res. 45/158, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 262, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990), entered into force 1 
July 2003 [hereinafter Migrant Workers Convention].
15 U.N. document A/C.3/42/SR.16.
16 U.N. document A/C.3/44/SR.16.
17 T.W. Harding, Human Rights Law in the Field of Mental Health: A Critical Review, 2000:101 ACTA 
PSYCHIATR SCAND 24, 25 (2000).  For discussions on the Soviet government’s manipulation of psychiatry to 
serve state interests, see A. Young-Anawaty, International Human Rights Norms and Soviet Abuse of Psychiatry, 
10:3 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. 785 (1978) and V. Rood, Soviet Abuse of Psychiatric Commitment: An International 
Human Rights Issue, 9:3 CAL. W. INT’L. L. J. 629 (1979).  For an examination of the historical and contemporary 
role and purposes of forensic psychiatry in China, see Robin Munro, Judicial Psychiatry in China and its Political 
Abuses, 14 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2000).  For NGO discussions of rights violations in the mental health context, 
see the various reports of Mental Disability Rights International, available at
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  This is in no way suggests that international human rights instruments developed in the 20th
century have no bearing on the rights of those diagnosed with mental disabilities.  On the contrary, 
existing Convention-based rights, most notably under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”)18 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”)19 have the potential to become important tools in disability rights advocacy, particularly with 
respect to drafting and interpreting domestic mental health legislation.20  These obligations are especially 
important given that there is no guarantee that the UN will actually adopt an effective Disability Rights 
Convention, or any Convention at all.  Further, there is no guarantee that governments would ratify such a 
Convention.21  However, in practice, these instruments have few provisions that relate directly to mental 
http://www.mdri.org/publications/index.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2003), including:  NOT ON THE AGENDA: 
HUMAN RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES IN KOSOVO (2002); HUMAN RIGHTS & 
MENTAL HEALTH: MEXICO (2000); CHILDREN IN RUSSIA'S INSTITUTIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM (1999); HUMAN RIGHTS & MENTAL HEALTH: HUNGARY (1997); and 
HUMAN RIGHTS & MENTAL HEALTH: URUGUAY (1995).  See also the reports of the Mental Disability 
Advocacy Center, available at http://www.mdac.info/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2003), including CAGE BEDS: 
INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT IN FOUR EU ACCESSION COUNTRIES (2003) (a report on the 
use of cage beds in psychiatric facilities in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia); WRITTEN 
COMMENTS OF THE MENTAL DISABILITY ADVOCACY CENTER CONCERNING ESTONIA FOR 
CONSIDERATION BY THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE AT ITS 77TH SESSION 
(2003); and WRITTEN COMMENTS OF THE MENTAL DISABILITY ADVOCACY CENTER CONCERNING
THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMITTEE AT ITS 78TH SESSION (2003).  Last, see Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 10, at 472 – 473: 
People with mental disabilities are often deprived of liberty for prolonged periods of time without 
legal process; subjected to peonage and forced labor in institutions; subjected to neglect in harsh 
institutional environments and deprived of basic health care; victimized by physical abuse and 
sexual exploitation; and exposed to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 
16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
19 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st 
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.
20 The most relevant of these Convention-based rights include:  the right to the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health; protections against discrimination; protections against torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment; and protections against arbitrary detention.
21 Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 10, at 470–471.  While the issue of the application of existing international 
human rights instruments to those diagnosed with mental disabilities is beyond the scope of this article, see 
Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 10 for the most comprehensive discussion available.  For specific discussion on 
the applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights to mental health law, see Lawrence O. Gostin, 
Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities: The European Convention of Human Rights, 23 INT’L J. L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 125 (2000); Gerard Quinn, Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1992); and T.W. Harding, The Application of the 
European Convention of Human Rights to the Field of Psychiatry, 9(4) MED. LAW. 1078 (1990).
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disability and “[h]uman rights oversight bodies that monitor the mainstream conventions and establish 
reporting guidelines have dedicated little attention to the rights of people with mental disabilities.”22
In the 1970s, the UN put forth its first instruments specifically addressing the rights of people 
with disabilities.  However, both the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons23 and the 
Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons24 reflected a “notion of disability that falls within the 
medical model, according to which disabled persons are primarily seen as individuals with medical 
problems, dependent on social security and welfare, and in need of segregated services and institutions.”25
The late 1980s and early 1990s were characterized by further movement in the field of mental disability 
rights.  In 1986, the Special Rapporteur appointed by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities authored a report titled “Principles, Guidelines and 
Guarantees for the Protection of Persons Detained on Grounds of Mental Ill-Health or Suffering from 
Mental Disorder.”  Soon after, the Vienna 1993 World Conference on Human Rights “reemphasized the 
fact that people with mental and physical disabilities are protected by international human rights law”.26
As a result of the recommendations of the Vienna Conference, the GA adopted a historic resolution in the 
1993 "Standard Rules on Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities" ("Standard Rules").  
Though the Standard Rules are not part of a Convention, and thus lack “hard law” status, they were “a 
revolutionary new international instrument because they establish[ed] citizen participation by people with 
disabilities as an internationally recognized human right.”27  Indeed, under the Standard Rules, 
22 Rosenthal and Sundram, id., at 474.  It can also be argued that traditionally disability rights groups have not 
exhausted the existing routes:  “[t]hese groups have filed few complaints with UN oversight bodies and have rarely 
submitted ‘shadow reports’ that can provide the UN bodies the facts needed to find governments in violation of 
international human rights law.”  See Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 9, at 477.  This certainly raises the 
question of how much of the responsibility should be assigned to advocates and how much should be laid on the 
treaty system and oversight mechanisms themselves.
23 G.A. Res. 2856 (XXVI), 26 U.N. GAOR Supp., at 93, U.N. Doc A/8429 (1971).
24 G.A. Res. 3447 (XXX), para.4, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 34 at 88, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
25 Theresia Degener & Gerard Quinn, A Survey Of International, Comparative And Regional Disability Law Reform, 
(paper presented at "From Principle to Practice: An International Disability Law and Policy Symposium"), available 
at http://www.dredf.org/symposium/degener1.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).  A detailed discussion of the medical 
model, contrasted with the social model, is contained in part IV of this article. 
26 Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 10, at 475.  
27 Id. at 476.
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governments were “required to remove obstacles to equal participation and actively to involve disability 
NGOs as partners in this process.”28
Most directly pertaining to the issue of mental disability, in 1991 the GA adopted the "Principles 
for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care" ("MI 
Principles").29  While the MI Principles are often referred to as the “‘centrepiece'" of international human 
rights law in the field of mental health”,30 they have been severely criticized for promoting a paternalistic 
medical-model perspective rather than a rights-based perspective, and for being weak on the right to 
refuse harmful neuroleptic antipsychotic treatment.  For example, Gendreau, of the Universite de 
Montreal, has argued that Principle 11 “…gives an eloquent illustration of the medical orientation now 
formally recognized by the General Assembly of the United Nations.”31  While Principle 11(4) grants 
patients the right, subject to certain limitations,  “to refuse or stop treatment”, it also requires that “[th]e 
consequences of refusing or stopping treatment must be explained to the patient.”  While upon initial 
glance this provision may appear benign, Gendreau’s more nuanced reading reveals the subtle influence 
of the medical model perspective: 
Why is this kind of information only required when a person refuses or wants to stop a 
treatment?  On the contrary, it should be part of the right to information included in the 
definition of informed consent.  This provision shows an obvious tendency to presume 
that the refusal of treatment always and exclusively has negative effects and that the 
acceptance of treatment always and exclusively has positive effects.  It implies that 
everything must be done to make those who refuse treatment change their mind, whether 
or not they are competent, by stressing the consequences of the negative choice being 
made.  In such circumstances, one may well doubt that a free decision was made by the 
patient and that an informed consent was validly obtained.32
28 Gerard Quinn and Theresia Degener, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY: THE CURRENT USE AND 
FUTURE POTENTIAL OF UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
DISABILITY 35 (February 2002).  
29 Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care, G.A. 
Res. 46/119, 46 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 49, Annex at 188-192, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991).  For a discussion of 
using MI Principles as a tool in interpreting relevant sections in human rights conventions, see Eric Rosenthal & 
Leonard S. Rubenstein, International Human Rights Advocacy under the "Principles for the Protection of Persons 
with Mental Illness," 16 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 257 (1993). 
30 Harding, supra note 17, at 24.
31 Caroline Gendreau, The Rights of Psychiatric Patients in the Light of the Principles Announced by the United 
Nations: A Recognition of the Right to Consent to Treatment?, 20:2 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 259, 270 (1997).
32 Id. at 272.  Gendreau concludes her analysis with the following condemnation of the MI Principles:
…far from recognizing the lay character of the decision to accept or to refuse a treatment, these 
Principles consecrate a particular medical approach to human rights.  In fact, the right to treatment 
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Further, the World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry (“WNUSP”) has questioned the 
credibility of the MI Principles, given that they “…were developed without significant involvement by 
psychiatric users and survivors.”33
III. The Debate regarding a Disability-Specific Convention
The present lack of a Disability Rights Convention can arguably be attributed more to disinterest 
than concrete objections.34  Other than the potential counter-productive repetition of existing mechanisms, 
predominates with health as a strong symbolic underlying value.  This health value, I must 
underline, is exclusively reduced to a medical perspective and it implies, for the psychiatric 
patient, the obligation to be treated without due consideration of his or her capacity to consent to 
treatment.  This means that the U.N. Principles effectively confer a supreme right of intervention 
upon medical authorities pursuing "the improvement of mental health care."  They impose a 
dichotomous conception of the protection of the person's rights and freedoms in which the right to 
treatment is set in opposition to the other human rights, without sufficient regard to a patient's own 
representation of health.  Such a perspective is obviously in concordance with the discourse 
founded on health held by well-represented participants to the drafting process of the U.N. 
Principles.  This is also in clear opposition with the other discourse founded on autonomy and 
equality held by a minority of participants. 
Id. at 276.  
33 WORLD NETWORK OF USERS AND SURVIVORS OF PSYCHIATRY PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ON 
THE UNITED NATIONS PRINCIPLES FOR THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS TO 
THE UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2000), available at http://www.wnusp.org/docs/nyreport.html
(last visited Oct. 21, 2003).  
34 The U.S. has expressed support for a Disability Rights Convention, but has stated that it will not become a party 
given its “comprehensive domestic laws protecting those with disabilities”.  See STATEMENT BY RALPH F. 
BOYD, UNITED STATES ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TO THE UN GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY AD HOC COMMITTEE (June 18, 2003), available at http://www.aapd.com/docs/missionun.html
(last visited Oct. 18, 2003).  In response, the U.S. International Council on Disabilities issued the following 
indictment of the U.S. government’s position:  
…we nonetheless believe the official U.S. Government position ignores the fundamental need for 
a United Nations Convention. Essentially, the U.S. has taken the position that a Convention is not 
necessary for the United States because we have excellent disability law, and that it is the 
responsibility of each country to develop its own laws also. Therefore, it will neither support nor 
oppose a Convention, but will offer "technical assistance" to the Ad Hoc Committee as requested. 
While we certainly appreciate the sovereign right and necessity of each country to develop their 
own laws, the U.S. position misses the point on several levels:
The role of [an] international Convention is never intended to supercede superior domestic laws, 
nor is it to replace the need for development of domestic law. Rather, a Convention provides a 
statement of universal human rights principles that underpin and reinforce domestic law where it 
exists, and provide minimum standards for what any domestic law - existing or new - should 
contain. 
The notion that Americans with disabilities - and, indeed, US disability law - would not be served 
by such a Convention, implies that the international human rights framework is not relevant to the 
United States and furthermore undermines the global importance of international human rights 
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which will be discussed below with respect to the issue of treaty monitoring, perhaps the most credible 
objection to the proposed Convention is that it will have the effect of further dramatizing differences 
between individuals with disabilities, and thus will be stigmatizing in and of itself.  This “dilemma of 
difference”35 reflects the concern that by addressing difference in an individual instrument, policy-makers 
may reinforce and perpetuate marginalization.  On the other hand, if difference is not addressed in an 
individual instrument, marginalization/stereotypes may be avoided, though the risk is that difference is 
ignored.  
This argument, however, is insufficient to thwart a potential Convention.  Rather than 
perpetuating marginalization, a disability-specific Convention affords the international community the 
opportunity to acknowledge difference and bring it into the mainstream.  This is especially important vis a 
vis mental disability, which carries with it a stigma that is arguably more entrenched than other forms of 
disability-related stigma.  Further, this fear did not prevent the adoption of other thematic conventions.  In 
other words, there is no reason to think that this marginalization would occur with respect to those with 
mental disabilities when no evidence can be found of its existence with respect to racial minorities, 
children and women.36
Instead, the reasons supporting a disability-specific Convention are many.  As previously 
discussed, international human rights instruments and treaty monitoring bodies have all but ignored the 
law. It is arrogant and disingenuous of the US (1) to declare that it has experience and expertise in 
such laws and (2) to offer technical assistance for a Convention that it has already declared as 
unnecessary. 
The U.S. disability community believes that the government is missing the opportunity to draw 
upon its national experience and contribute in a meaningful way to a critical international policy 
process to which the disability community - both in the US and abroad - has attached great 
importance.
RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITIES (USICD) TO THE 
STATEMENT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITION AS DELIVERED BY THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY 
GENERAL FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (June 18, 2003), available at http://www.aapd.com/docs/generalcivilrights.html
(last visited Oct. 18, 2003).
35 As described by scholar Martha Minow.  See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: 
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990).
36 Quinn and Degener, supra note 28 at 297.  
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issues confronting those with disabilities.37  A thematic Convention is the strongest way to ensure that 
those with disabilities remain “visible”.38  With this visibility comes the articulation of specified rights 
and the mechanisms necessary for ensuring compliance (in other words, a primary, centralized body to 
monitor compliance, coupled with a detailed reporting mechanism).  Further, it has been argued that the 
very process of treaty-making can result in key benefits, such as heightening public awareness of rights, 
bringing to the surface ignored rights violations, developing NGO and government knowledge-bases 
(which can evolve into law and policy reform and public-education initiatives), coalition building 
between disability organizations (and between these organizations and non disability-related civil society 
actors), catalyzing programmatic developments and facilitating the cost-effective collection of data.39
Last, the absence of a binding disability-specific Convention means that there will continue to be minimal 
consideration given to the correlation between disability and poverty.  As stated by World Bank President 
James D. Wolfensohn, “[f]our hundred million disabled people live in the world's developing countries.  
All too often their lives go hand in hand with poverty, isolation and despair.”40  Wolfensohn goes on to 
note that “[m]ore than 1.3 billion people worldwide struggle to exist on less than $1 a day, and the 
disabled in their countries live at the bottom of the pile.”41
IV. The Social Model of Disability vs. The Medical Model:  The Move to a Rights-Based 
Paradigm
The draft and eventual final text of the proposed Convention will be the end result of negotiating 
the tensions between two opposed theoretical models.  Disability has traditionally been defined according 
to the “medical model” which continues to be the dominant model of healthcare in countries such as the 
37 "[I]nternational human rights forums have been generally unresponsive to the situation and specific needs of 
persons with disabilities."  See Philip Alston, Disability and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: The Legal Framework, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABLED PERSONS: ESSAYS AND 
RELEVANT HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 94 (Theresia Degener and Yolan Koster-Dreese, eds., 1995).  
38 Quinn and Degener, supra note 28 at 297.  
39 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTION ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (June 12, 2002), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/unwhitepaper_05-23-02.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).  
40 James D. Wolfensohn, Poor Disabled and Shut Out, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 3, 2002, A25, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/B-SPAN/docs/wolfensohn_op_ed_120302.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
41 Id.
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U.S.  This model construes disability as “…an observable, mental, sensory or psychological deviation 
from normality caused by disease, trauma or another health condition.”42  Under the medical model, the 
functional limitations arising from these conditions can sometimes be prevented or managed by medical 
treatment.43  In that regard, the individual is considered problematized and thus is “an object for clinical 
intervention.”44  This model can be contrasted with the social model, which advocates for an 
understanding of disability as a social construct:
Perceiving disability as a condition similar to illness and exclusively as a functional 
limitation means that disability is considered as an individual rather than a societal 
problem, and that solutions are searched in the individual sphere…Thus, neither the 
society nor the environment have to be changed…The disability movement rejects this 
medical approach because of the subjectivity of the defining process and the power 
relations in which it takes place.  What is regarded as a disability depends to a great 
extent on individual, societal, cultural and medical perceptions of what is “normal” and 
this in turn depends very much on the point of comparison.45
Applying this paradigm to mental health specifically, clinical psychologist A. Galves has 
argued as follows:
The conception of human beings that is reflected by mainstream psychiatry is overly 
narrow and reductionistic.  It portrays human beings as a mass of random chemical and 
physical dynamics at worst and weak, dependent, irrational victims at best.  Psychiatry 
has lost track of the most important and valuable parts of human beings: their drives, 
instincts, emotions and wills.  Without an accurate conception of the organism they are 
treating, it is impossible for psychiatrists to provide effective treatment.46
42 Aart C. Hendricks, Different Definition – Same Problem – One Way Out?, in DIABILITY RIGHTS LAW AND 
POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 195, 199 (Mary Lou Breslin and Silvia Yee, 
eds., 2002).
43 Id.
44 Quinn and Degener, supra note 28, at 14.  For further elaboration on traditional disability models, see Gareth 
Williams, Theorizing Disability, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 123 (Gary L. Albrecht, Katherine D. 
Seelman & Michael Bury eds., 2001).
45 Theresia Degener, Disabled Persons and Human Rights: The Legal Framework, in Degener and Koster-Dreese, 
supra note 36, at 13.  See also H. Hahn, Towards a Politics of Disability: Definitions, Disciples, and Policies, 22:4 
SOC. SCI. J. 87 (1985); and P. Abberly, The Concept of Oppression and the Development of a Social Theory of 
Disability, 2:1 DISABILITY, HANDICAP & SOC’Y 5 (1987).  
46 DAVID OAKS, HOW TO HAVE MAD PRIDE WHILE YOU'RE PROTESTING IN FRONT OF THOUSANDS 
OF PSYCHIATRISTS, available at: http://www.mindfreedom.org/mindfreedom/m18_main.shtml (last visited Oct. 
21, 2003).  In his resignation letter from the American Psychiatric Association, Dr. Loren Mosher (former head of 
the Center for Studies of Schizophrenia at the National Institute of Mental Health in Washington, D.C.) states:  “No 
longer do we seek to understand whole persons in their social contexts -- rather we are there to realign our patients' 
neurotransmitters.  The problem is that it is very difficult to have a relationship with a neurotransmitter -- whatever 
its configuration.  So, our guild organization provides a rationale, by its neurobiological tunnel vision, for keeping 
our distance from the molecule conglomerates we have come to define as patients.”  See Letter from Dr. Loren 
Mosher to Dr. Rodrigo Munoz, then President of the American Psychiatric Association (Dec. 4, 1998), available at
http://hem.fyristorg.com/mosher/resig.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2003). 
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Though some commentators have suggested that “[o]ver time, this medical model of disability is 
being replaced”,47 it is abundantly clear that with respect to mental disability, the prevailing model is still 
the medical-model.  Indeed, it is not only the medical community that has resisted understanding mental 
illness as a social construct:  “[t]he disability movement has also, at times, been reluctant to include 
people with mental health problems.  The fear of mental illness which stalks society at large is shared by 
many who otherwise are active in challenging social exclusion and who argue, in other contexts, that 
disability resides in the attitudes of society rather than in physical or mental variations from the norm.”48
I would caution that we must remain vigilant of the medical-model’s intrusion into the Convention 
drafting process.  If past international human rights instruments, such as the MI Principles, are any 
indicator, there is certainly reason for concern.49  The strongest assertion of this model thus far in the 
drafting process has come from the Pan American Health Organization (“PAHO”), which serves as the 
World Health Organization’s (“WHO”) Regional Office for the Americas and as the health organization 
of the Inter-American System.  PAHO’s submission to the Committee is retrogressive and unhelpful to 
the development of a strong Convention calling as it does for the incorporation of the MI Principles, 
“especially with regard to consent to treatment…”50
47 Arlene S. Kanter, The Globalization of Disability Rights Law, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 241, 247 
(2003). 
48 Kate Harrison, Disability and Mental Health Law, in LAW, RIGHTS AND DISABILITY 193 (Jeremy Cooper, 
ed., 2000).  Indeed, in reviewing materials on the “social model of disability”, I was struck by the lack of any 
meaningful discussion regarding mental disability.
49 See footnotes 31 – 33 above.
50 PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION (MENTAL HEALTH AND SPECIALIZED PROGRAMS 
UNIT), CONTRIBUTIONS AND PROPOSAL FOR A CONVENTION ON PROTECTION AND PROMOTION 
OF THE RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/uncontrib-paho.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2003) [emphasis added].
In general there has been a strong medical-model voice in international bodies’ attempts to  address mental health 
issues.  For example, the WHO is presently developing a “Manual on Mental Health Legislation” (“Manual”).  The 
purpose of the Manual is to bring “…together information on international norms and standards in the area of mental 
health and human rights, as well as best practice information on mental health law in countries, in order to inform 
and assist countries wishing to formulate and implement legislation.”  See WHO MENTAL HEALTH AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, available at http://www.who.int/mental_health/media/en/606.pdf (last visited Oct. 
19, 2003).  The draft Manual, which is arguably at least somewhat reflective of a rights-based perspective, was 
circulated for discussion amongst stakeholders and received the following comments from a noted Professor of Law 
and Psychiatry at Harvard University:
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The argument in favour of a rights-based approach focusing on individual dignity, rather than a 
medical-based approaching focusing on treatment, is not simply related to concerns about the efficacy and 
repercussions of the actual treatment.  It also relates to the methodology that results in the prescription of 
treatment.  As discussed above, the social construct theory holds that despite the assertions of those 
supporting the medical-model paradigm, what is labeled as disability “is not generally selected through a 
neutral or disinterested process” but rather “through an apparatus of power”.51  The connection between 
the biases of mental health practitioners and psychiatric diagnoses is quite illustrative of this concern: 
The fact that physicians consider treatment and cure to be their first priority should, 
however, be recognized as a powerful value system that will inevitably skew professional 
judgment.  For example, a physician's doubts about a patient's competence to accept or 
refuse treatment are typically resolved in the patient's favor if the patient wishes to accept 
treatment; the patient's competence is challenged only if she refuses treatment.  In 
addition, medical professionals readily sacrifice patient autonomy to protect patients from 
harm or to reduce risks to their health.  
…
Members of a given profession also tend to share a professional consensus on many 
issues -- particularly regarding diagnoses and treatments -- for which there is actually 
little or conflicting empirical support.  For example, mental health professionals rely 
heavily on interviews for diagnosis even though studies show that interviews are not 
…it seems rather to be the work of lawyers who have been trapped in a time warp since the 1970s.  
This draft of the manual would impose on the rest of the world the complex array of legal 
restrictions and red tape that antipsychiatry ideologues imposed on American psychiatry back in 
that era.
…
…the draft's experts have the same basic goal as the antipsychiatry legal advocates of the 1970s.  
Every psychiatric intervention is to be contested on legal grounds.  One can find lots of verbiage 
in the draft about the importance of families, about the plague of mental illness and about the need 
for treatment.  But the actual provisions come straight from the most radical rights-driven models 
of the 1970s.  The underlying rationale in the 1970s was skepticism about the reality of mental 
disorders and the efficacy and risks of psychotropic drugs. Thirty years later, this skepticism, often 
based on ignorance and bias, cannot be justified.
Alan A. Stone, M.D, Commentary: On Formulating Mental Health Codes for the World, (July 2002), 
available at http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/p020701c.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2003).  The premise that 
the Manual is reflective of a rights-based paradigm is hotly contested.  Mental disability rights NGOs have 
issued equally scathing critiques of the draft Manual, but for the opposite reason, arguing that it “obscures 
and justifies human rights violations such as forced interventions and incarceration by labelling them as 
treatment.”  See COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT WHO MANUAL ON MENTAL HEALTH 
LEGISLATION (July 12, 2001), available at http://www.wnusp.org/docs/dr_m_funk.html (last visited Oct. 
19, 2003).  
51 Quinn and Degener, supra note 28, at 15.  Reliance on  allegedly “objective” medical research and assessments is 
key to the medical-model paradigm and vigorously defended by its supporters.  As stated by Dr. Alan A. Stone,  
Touroff-Glueck Professor of Law and Psychiatry in the faculties of law and medicine at Harvard University, 
“Lawyers may have a different perspective, but physicians usually look to the available empirical evidence and 
insist on proof that a method works.”  See Stone, id. 
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particularly likely to yield valid results; many standard tests relied upon by mental health 
professionals are similarly deficient.  Worse, studies show that professionals have great 
confidence in their own judgments and are highly resistant to changing them, even when 
these judgments are based on invalid tools of diagnosis.  Evidence suggests that some 
professional judgments in the mental health field are made within minutes of meeting the 
client.   
…
Treatment for health problems, especially mental health problems, requires an 
understanding of the patient's culture and personal history.  Researchers have observed 
that "as the sociocultural distance between the clinician and his patient increases, 
diagnoses become less accurate."  This problem is particularly intense in the public sector 
where the involuntary "clients," unlike their caretakers, are disproportionately members 
of racial minorities and are indigent.  In state and county hospitals, black men are 
hospitalized at a rate 2.8 times greater than white men, and black women at a rate 2.5 
times greater than white women.  By contrast, only about 2% of psychiatrists are black.  
Out of 273,600 licensed psychologists in this country in 1986, only 10,000 were black.  
Ninety percent of the 3,209 doctorates in psychology in 1989 were awarded to whites.   
Studies on diagnosis and treatment confirm what these statistics suggest: members of 
minorities are misdiagnosed far more often than white patients. The misdiagnosis usually 
takes the form of overdiagnosing schizophrenia in black patients; blacks are diagnosed 
with schizophrenia at almost twice the rate of white inpatients.  Because schizophrenia is 
generally considered one of the most serious mental disorders, misdiagnosis may be one 
explanation for the fact that minorities are involuntarily committed to state institutions at 
a statistically disproportionate rate.  Once there, black men are far more likely to be 
subject to seclusion than white men.52
If we accept a social construct theory of disability, the logical progression is a move to a rights-
based paradigm that focuses on the dignity of the individual and the responsibility of the State “…to 
52 Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to Abdication Under the Professional 
Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 657 - 660 (1992) (footnotes omitted).  T.W. Harding, of the Institute of 
Forensic Medicine, University of Geneva, has attributed failings in psychiatry partially to the context in which it 
originated:
It is important to recall several facts about the origins of psychiatry:
(a) it was closely linked with legal and forensic medicine, and therefore associated with the 
judicial system and social control;
(b) it developed largely outside academic centers of medicine; indeed, when the first chairs of 
psychological medicine were established in Berlin (Prof. Griesinger) and Edinburgh (Prof. 
Robertson), the basis of institutional psychiatry began to be
questioned;
(c) it adopted enthusiastically theories of criminal anthropology, in particular the concepts
of degeneration and atavism, which underpin the concepts of innate dangerousness and
untreatability.
Even modern, ‘scientific’ psychiatry has problems of ridding itself of the consequence of these 
dubious origins, which are still reflected in existing legal provisions.
See Harding, supra note 17, at 25. 
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tackle socially created obstacles in order to ensure full respect for the dignity and equal rights of all 
persons.”53  Such a rights-based approach is an essential step forward in disability advocacy and must 
inform the drafting of the proposed Convention for it to be effective.  This approach empowers persons 
with disabilities to transform what have traditionally been viewed as needs into claimable rights:  “[i]n 
reorienting the focus from needs to rights, people with disabilities may be recognized as active rights-
bearing individuals who are participants in their own development and who should be consulted 
accordingly in development decision-making.”54
V. Recommendations in Drafting the Proposed Disability Rights Convention
While a Disability Rights Convention is needed and would be a move towards recognizing and 
protecting the rights of those with disabilities, “there is also a need for the drafters of any new disability 
rights instruments to proceed with caution.”55  In particular, Rosenthal and Sundram have cautioned that 
in formulating a new instrument, regard must be had to existing instruments in order to avoid mistakes 
that have thwarted past attempts at codifying disability rights.56  Indeed, while it might appear self-
evident upon initial consideration, there is great peril in drafting a new instrument that provides fewer
protections than existing instruments.57
It is also necessary to remain mindful of the relationship between the ideal and the real.  States 
and stakeholders advocating for the inclusion of particular protections and principles must consider how 
far ahead a human rights treaty can progress beyond what the international community is prepared to 
53 Quinn and Degener, supra note 28, at 14.  Indeed, the disability rights movement has been referred to as the “next 
generation” civil rights movement.  Id. at 15.   
54 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 38.  As stated by Quinn and Degener, id. at 296:  
The need for a holistic approach to disability is consonant with the postulate that civil and political 
rights, on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights, on the other, are interdependent 
and interrelated… This is not the freedom of welfare, which places people with disabilities in 
gilded cages and locks them into cycles of dependency and despondency.  It is economic, social 
and cultural justice, which liberates people with disabilities so that they can play their part in – and 
contribute their share to – inclusive societies.
55 Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 9, at 470.  
56 Id.
57 Id.  
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accept.  For example, the Migrant Workers Convention was essentially the result of states that regularly 
receive migrant workers capitulating to the demands of states from where migrant workers often originate 
(e.g. Mexico, the Philippines).  It was, in fact, in the interests of the “receiving countries” to be non-
responsive.  Thus, though it came into force on July 1, 2003, no receiving countries have ratified it.  At 
worst, the Convention can be seen as a sort of “ghost treaty” that will never have any real meaning.  With 
this principle in mind, while disability-related NGOs admirably represented the perspectives of persons 
with disabilities at the Working Group Meeting, in general they did not come prepared to engage with 
states on legal issues.  Rather, particular submissions (e.g. that the proposed Convention should have 
direct application to private parties and should create rights not previously recognized in international 
human rights law, rather than acknowledging that existing rights are applicable to persons with 
disabilities and focusing on how to implement them) served only to undermine NGO credibility and to 
unnecessarily raise the backs of states.58
Progressive Realization
The issue of whether governments would be obligated to take immediate action to effect the 
provisions of the proposed Convention relating to economic and social rights is fundamental.  The 
ICESCR provides that governments “undertake to take steps…with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant”.59  While Rosenthal and Sundram point 
to the “extensive body of jurisprudence and comment” interpreting the progressive realization 
requirement as involving some level of immediate obligation, it should be noted that such commentary 
58 See also WNUSP’s suggestion that the Convention should include a sort of paramountcy clause, where other 
international instruments that are “in contravention with or derogation of the provisions of this convention [are] 
deemed void ab initio.” SUBMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS AD HOC COMMITTEE ON A 
COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRAL INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION TO PROMOTE AND PROTECT 
THE RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (2003), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/contrib-wnusp.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003) [hereinafter WNUSP 
SUBMISSION].
59 ICESCR, supra note 19, Art. 2(1).
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essentially stems from the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ General Comment No. 3, 
which represents the Committee’s interpretation of the ICESCR.60  However authoritative, General 
Comments are not binding in law.61  I suggest that a more favorable approach would be to include a 
provision imposing immediate obligations where those obligations are within the state party's means:    
In relation to the economic, social and cultural rights set forth in [Part III of] this 
Convention, States Parties undertake to give immediate effect to those aspects of those 
rights which are capable of immediate implementation (including, but not limited to 
obligations of non-discrimination in the enjoyment of those rights) and in relation to 
other aspects of those rights, to take steps to the maximum of their available resources 
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of those rights by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.62
Definition of Disability
As recognized by participants in the June 2003 Asian and Pacific regional expert group meeting 
held in Bangkok, there is a range of potential definitions of "disability" should the Committee elect to 
include a definition.  Thus, in keeping with the social model of disability advocated by this article, it is 
essential that any “definition of disability should not be restrictive. For example it should cover physical, 
sensory, intellectual, psychiatric and multiple disabilities.  It should acknowledge that disability can be 
permanent, temporary, episodic and perceived…[i]t has a range of implications for social identity and 
60 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc.E/1991/23 
(1991). 
61 Though it can be argued that states’ acquiescence to General Comments over time allow them to form part of 
customary international law, this is far from satisfying:  “Alston and Quinn… believe international jurisprudence 
effectively imposes immediate obligations on states to adopt strategies that will lead to the full realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights, as set out in this Covenant.  Whilst this may be true as an abstract statement of 
international law, the reality is more pedestrian.”  Jeremy Cooper, Improving the Civil Rights of People with 
Disabilities Through International Law, in LAW, RIGHTS AND DISABILITY 193 (Jeremy Cooper, ed., 2000). 
62 CHAIR'S DRAFT ELEMENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRAL INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTION ON PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF PERSONS WITH 
DISABILITIES, Art. 2(1), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/wgcontrib-chair1.htm (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2004) [hereinafter Chair’s Draft].  Unfortunately, this provision in the Chair’s Draft was not included 
in the Working Group Draft submitted to the Committee.  See DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRAL 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE RIGHTS AND 
DIGNITY OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, CRP.4, plus CRP.4/Add.1, Add.2, Add.4 and Add.5, available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcwgreportax1.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2004) [hereinafter Working 
Group Draft].   
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behaviour, and largely depends upon context.”63  National Human Rights Institutions (“NHRIs”) from 
across Africa (including those from Kenya, Niger, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zambia) met in Munyonyo-Kampala, Uganda in June 2003 to discuss the proposed 
Convention.  The NHRIs have appropriately recommended that any definition of discrimination must 
“recognise the impact of dual or multiple discrimination faced by individuals such as women, children, 
refugees, minorities or persons with multiple disabilities or other status.”64  With respect to those 
suffering from mental disability, perhaps the most important consideration besides inclusiveness is that 
any definition  “…is comfortable both for people with disabilities who identify with medical terminology 
and diagnosis, and for those who reject medical terminology and identify with disability as a social and 
political category only.”65
Equality and non-discrimination
Certain delegations to the Working Group preferred a treaty based on non-discrimination rather 
than one that adopts a comprehensive approach.  For example, the European Union’s (EU) draft 
submission to the Working Group emphasizes issues of discrimination and equality of opportunity.66
This was not, however, the preference of the majority of participants.  Whichever way the Committee 
decides, undoubtedly the issue of discrimination is pertinent for those with any sort of disability and is 
particularly resonant for persons diagnosed with mental disabilities.67
63 BANGKOK RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ELABORATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRAL 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION TO PROMOTE AND PROTECT THE RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (2003), available at 
http://www.worldenable.net/bangkok2003/recommendations.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003) [hereinafter 
BANGKOK RECOMMENDATIONS].
64 FINAL DECLARATION OF THE REGIONAL WORKSHOP ON PROMOTING THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS 
WITH DISABILITIES: TOWARDS A NEW UN CONVENTION (June 6, 2003), available at
http://www.dpi.org/en/resources/topics/convention/documents/conv_FINAL-Declaration-Kampala-disability.pdf
(last visited Oct. 18, 2003).
65 WNUSP SUBMISSION, supra note 58.
66 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE FULL ENJOYMENT OF ALL HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS BY PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/a_ac265_2003_crp13_add2.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
67See Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 10, at 472 – 473: 
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At the Working Group meeting, WNUSP (the sole accredited NGO representing the mental 
health consumer/survivor perspective) questioned the necessity of distinguishing between direct and 
indirect discrimination as advocated by the EU.  It argued that such a distinction creates a sort of 
“loophole” for discrimination to exist and pointed out that CEDAW and CERD are silent on this issue.  In 
other words, while a provision or policy that directly targets a historically disadvantaged group is not 
justifiable, specifying indirect discrimination necessarily leaves open the possibility that employers, 
service providers etc. will be able to establish a defense or justification for the discrimination.68  As per 
WNUSP, this could pose a real danger for mental health consumer/survivors.  Though not explicitly 
stated at the Working Group, the idea is that this “loophole” could be used, for example, to justify forced 
psychiatric hospitalization.
This position was echoed by Canada, though for reasons unrelated to mental disability.  In the 
1999 case of British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Comm.) v. B.C.G.S.E.U.
(“Meiorin”),69 the Supreme Court of Canada restructured the analytical approach to be applied in all 
discrimination cases.  The Court noted that the distinction between direct and indirect, or “adverse 
effects,” discrimination was artificial, as most discrimination does not fit into such neat and well-defined 
categories.  Given that the threshold distinction was difficult to establish, it was seen as problematic that  
divergent results flowed from the way the discrimination was characterized.  The Court also pointed out 
that judges might purposely classify a rule as direct discrimination or adverse effect discrimination 
 [They] are often denied opportunities to receive an education, to work, or to enjoy the benefits of 
public services or other accommodations…  In some countries, people with mental disabilities are 
subject to de jure discrimination - the arbitrary denial of rights that are afforded to all other 
citizens.  Improper discrimination may also take place against people with no disability at all - if 
they are improperly viewed as having a mental disorder, or if they once experienced a mental 
disorder earlier in life.
68 The EU presented this simple, but instructive, example:  if a state agency were to mandate that individuals pass a 
sight test before obtaining a driver’s license, this might be neutral on its face (in other words, not direct 
discrimination), but have the indirect effect of discriminating against those who are visually impaired.  However, the 
state should have the ability to argue that this restriction is necessary.  The resulting text in the Working Group Draft 
reads as follows:  “Discrimination does not include a provision, criterion or practice that is objectively and 
demonstrably justified by the State Party by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are reasonable and 
necessary.”  See Working Group Draft, supra note 62 (Art. 7(3)).
69 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Comm.) v. B.C.G.S.E.U. [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
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depending on whether they preferred to see the rule preserved or struck down.  In recognition of these 
issues, the Court decided to bring the two analytical approaches together such that the distinction between 
direct discrimination and adverse effects was irrelevant.70
The problem with this approach is two-fold.  First, whereas a defense to discrimination was 
previously only available with respect to indirect discrimination, with this reformulation, the duty to 
accommodate to the point of undue hardship is made a key element of any defense to a claim of 
discrimination (in other words, even in situations respecting direct discrimination).  More importantly, 
Meiorin was situated within the context of discrimination based on sex.  It is arguable that unlike other 
forms of discrimination, discrimination in the context of disability is rarely overt, but rather is embedded 
in cultures that do not accommodate disability.71  Thus, the utility of indirect discrimination is that it 
permits challenges to more covert forms of discrimination.  While it is true that this leaves open the 
ability for a defense to indirect discrimination, this defense should be tightly circumscribed and should 
only become “live” after all efforts have been made to reasonably accommodate the difference of 
disability.
Perhaps the more interesting question, however, is the link between reasonable accommodation 
and disability.  The duty of state parties to reasonably accommodate those with disabilities became one of 
the most debated and important aspects of the Working Group session.  Without doubt, key ground was 
made.  In the sub-group established by New Zealand Ambassador Don McKay (who acted as Coordinator 
of the Working Group) there was agreement among delegations on the need for a concept such as 
reasonable accommodation in the proposed Convention in order to secure compliance with the principle 
of non-discrimination.  There was also widespread agreement on the need to keep the notion both general 
and flexible in order to ensure that it could be readily adapted to different sectors (e.g., employment, 
70 For support of this unified approach, see David M. Lepofsky, The Duty to Accommodate: A Purposive Approach, 
1 CAN. LAB. L.J. 1 (1993).
71 See Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 10, at 472 – 473:  “In many cases, the laws do not actively discriminate 
against people with mental disabilities, but they may place improper or unnecessary barriers or burdens on 
individuals with mental disabilities.”
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education, etc.) and in order to respect the diversity of legal traditions.  Further, there was general 
agreement that the process of determining what amounts to a reasonable accommodation should be both 
individualized (in the sense that it should consciously address the individual’s specific need for 
accommodation) and interactive as between the individual and the relevant entity concerned.  It was also 
understood that the availability of state funding should limit the use of ‘disproportionate burden’ as a 
reason by employers and service providers not to provide reasonable accommodation.
However, there was strong disagreement over whether a failure to reasonably accommodate 
should itself constitute discrimination.  Most notably, Ireland (which has presidency of, and thus 
represented, the EU), contrary to the Bangkok Recommendations and the Chair’s Draft, was of the view 
that it would be out of place in a Convention such as the one proposed to dictate the manner by which the 
concept of reasonable accommodation should be achieved or framed under relevant domestic legislation.  
Contrary to this position, the link between a failure to reasonably accommodate and discrimination is 
what gives efficacy to the principle of non-discrimination and should not be left to the imagination.72  In 
that regard, General Comment No. 5 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
interprets reasonable accommodation as a corollary to non-discrimination by specifically containing a 
definition of disability that includes a “denial of reasonable accommodation based on disability…”73
States’ Obligations74
In the context of states’ obligations, the Mexico Draft is particularly useful with respect to mental 
disabilities.  Inter alia, it includes provisions that would “prevent persons with disabilities from being 
72 This argument was supported at the Working Group, inter alia, by delegations from Germany and the European 
Disability Forum.
73 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 5, 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1994/13 (1994).
74 With respect to states’ obligations in general Rehabilitation International argued at the Working Group that six 
overarching principles must be remembered:  (1) states should take effective measures in both the legal and 
administrative spheres; (2) states should act to expunge laws that are not in harmony with the spirit of the proposed 
Convention; (3) states should ensure that failure to reasonably accommodate persons with disabilities constitutes 
discrimination; (4) states should takes steps with a view towards mainstreaming disability; (5) states should include 
persons with disabilities and their representative organizations as partners in the design and review of all policies 
that relate to them; and (6) states should takes steps to eliminate stereotypes regarding persons with disabilities.
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subjected to any form of exploitation, abusive, or degrading treatment in hospitals and psychiatric 
institutions”75 and would have both private and public psychiatric facilities “painstakingly monitored by 
the health authorities in order to ensure that the living conditions of and treatment administered to said 
institutions' patients are in keeping with respect for their dignity and human rights.”76  The Mexico Draft 
also impressively provides unfettered access for psychiatric patients to their medical records, 77 but should 
be reworded so that this access is only provided to patients, not family members, unless patient approval 
is first obtained. 
(i) The Right To Physical And Psychological Integrity
Perhaps the most pressing issue facing those diagnosed with a mental disability is the right to  
physical and psychological integrity.  The two most salient aspects of this right involve forced psychiatric 
hospitalization and forced treatment.  WNUSP has made its position on these issues very clear:  “[t]he 
right to autonomy of mind and body, to reject unwanted treatments, is…crucial.  The right to say "No" is 
central to the preservation of mental and bodily integrity.”78  The implication of this position is that the 
Convention “should prohibit unwanted medical and related interventions as a form of torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment…[and] prohibit any kind of confinement or internment 
based in whole or in part on disability.”79
(ii) Forced Psychiatric Treatment
Certainly WNUSP’s position has traditionally been seen as being on the fringes, and 
75 TEXT OF ELEMENTS FOR A UNITED NATIONS COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRAL 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION TO PROMOTE AND PROTECT THE RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, Art. 11, available at http://www.sre.gob.mx/discapacidad/elements.htm (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2003). 
76 Id. (Art. 12(c)).
77 Id. (Art. 12(e)).  The importance of this provision cannot be overstated.  In countries such as Canada, physicians 
in particular provinces (for example, Ontario) are able to prevent patients from viewing their own records if 
disclosure of the clinical record is likely to result in “serious harm to the treatment or recovery of the patient while in 
treatment at the psychiatric facility”.  This is an unacceptably ambigous test that deprives patients of a most basic 
and essential right.  See Mental Health Act, R.S.O. c. M.7 (1990).
78 WNUSP SUBMISSION, supra note 58.
79 Id.  This position was supported at the Working Group by the delegations representing Inclusion International (an 
NGO that focuses on advocacy for the human rights of people with intellectual disabilities), the World Federation 
for the Deaf and Disabled Peoples’ International. 
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undoubtedly, it is the antithesis of the medical model.80  Rosenthal and Sundram have observed that 
“[a]ctivists who are fighting for a ban on coercive treatment…may find it impossible to gain political 
support of language of this kind”, 81 and further point to the need to “make practical compromises” in 
order to secure widespread ratification.82  The reality of this observation became apparent at the Working 
Group meeting, as the EU and states such as Canada, Japan, India and Sierra Leone expressed trepidation 
at a blanket prohibition on forced institutionalization and treatment.  
In adopting an inflexible bargaining stance at the Working Group meeting, WNUSP missed a key 
opportunity to help shape the normative content of broad statements of rights that are more likely to be 
accepted by states.  This opportunity was invaluable when considering that while the EU and the above-
mentioned states supported the principle that such deprivations of liberty should not take place without 
appropriate legal safeguards, no delegation came to the Working Group with suggestions on what those 
safeguards, or the principles underlying them, should be.  In an attempt to fill this gap as the Committee 
goes deeper into the drafting process, certain recommendations can be made.  First, the only acceptable 
“practical compromises” would involve a governing principle that limits forced treatment to the rarest of 
occasions.  The WHO’s “Principles” respecting mental health allude to this by stating that findings of 
80 At least with respect to forced treatment, however, the supplement proposed to the Standard Rules by former 
Special Rapporteur on Disability Bengt Lindqvist (which will come before the Commission on Social Development 
in February 2004), appears to lend support to this position:
States should recognize that persons with disabilities have the same right to self-determination as 
other citizens, including the right to accept or refuse treatment.
…
States should ensure that medical facilities and personnel inform people with disabilities of their 
right to self-determination, including the requirement of informed consent, the right to refuse 
treatment and the right not to comply with forced admission to institutional facilities. States should 
also prevent unwanted medical and related interventions and/or corrective surgeries from being 
imposed on persons with disabilities.
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR OF THE COMMISSION FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ON 
MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STANDARD RULES ON THE EQUALIZATION OF 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES ON HIS THIRD MANDATE, 2000-2002, 25, U.N. 
Document E/CN.5/2002/4.
81 Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 9, at 492.  
82 Id. at 493.  
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incapacity to make treatment decisions “will typically be the case occasionally but not systematically”.83
Regard should also be had for the Council of Europe’s concept of “proportionality”, where any protective 
measures are required to be proportional to the needs of the individual concerned.  In other words, there 
should be recognition of varying degrees of capacity.  Such protective measures should also alter the 
“…rights and freedoms of the person concerned to the minimum extent which is consistent with 
achieving the purpose of the intervention.”84  In these rarest of occasions where an individual is found to 
lack capacity to consent to treatment, treatment should only be administered with the consent of his/her 
legally authorized representative or substitute decision-maker.  Further, if the individual expressed any 
prior instructions with respect to psychiatric treatment, at a time when he/she was capable, these 
previously expressed wishes must be respected.85
Individuals who are to be the subject of forced treatment should be provided with alternatives to 
antipsychotic medications.  It should not be presumed that chemical treatment modalities represent the 
only viable path.  Rather, psychological science studies have further “…established conclusively that an 
intensive interpersonal intervention…within a “therapeutic community” context – and staffed by 
nonmedical, nonprofessional personnel – could substantially reduce the use of [neuroleptic 
medications].”86
83 Principle 4, MENTAL HEALTH CARE LAW: TEN BASIC PRINCIPLES (1996), available at
http://www.who.int/mental_health/media/en/75.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2003) [emphasis added].  In reality, this is 
often far from the case.  Ontario, Canada is often praised for having progressive mental health legislation.  However, 
as co-counsel for the interveners Mental Health Legal Committee and Mental Health Legal Advocacy Coalition in 
Starson v. Swayze, the author submitted statistics to the Supreme Court of Canada demonstrating that the Ontario 
Consent and Capacity Board overwhelmingly rejects patients’ applications challenging psychiatrist’s findings of 
incapacity respecting treatment.  In 2001, for example, there was a staggering 94 percent rejection rate.  See 
Memorandum of Argument of the Proposed Interveners, The Mental Health Legal Committee and The Mental 
Health Legal Advocacy Coalition (Motion For Leave To Intervene) at 11, Starson v. Swayze [2003] S.C.C. 32 (Can.) 
(No. 28799).
84 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF INCAPABLE 
ADULTS, RECOMMENDATION No. R (99) 4 Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 23 February 1999 
(Principle 6).
85 These principle are reflected in Articles 6(3) and 9 of the Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, reprinted in 36 ILM 821 (1997).
86 D. Cohen, A Critique of the Use of Neuroleptic Drugs in Psychiatry, in FROM PLACEBO TO PANACEA: 
PUTTING PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS TO THE TEST (S. Fisher & R. Greenburg, eds.) 173, 200 – 2001 (1997).  
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Since their introduction to psychiatry in 1952, neuroleptic or “antipsychotic” drugs such as
haloperidol, chlorpromazine, olanzapine, risperidone and clozapine have been prescribed to millions of 
individuals diagnosed as suffering from various psychotic disorders.  However, studies have concluded 
that these medications , described as “one of the most behaviorally toxic classes of psychotropic drugs”,
enjoy no more than a 34% net effectiveness rate in terms of their ability to reduce relapse.87  A 
remarkable WHO study shows a correlation between low reliance on antipsychotic medication and 
recovery.  Beginning in 1969, this research identified patients diagnosed with schizophrenia in nine 
countries (China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, India, Nigeria, USSR, United Kingdom and the 
U.S.) and monitored their progress over the next eight years.  The most striking result was that the 
patients from the three poorest countries (where doctors did not generally keep the patients on 
antipsychotics) did dramatically better than patients in the developed countries (where the majority of 
patients were kept on antipsychotics).  At the five year mark, while more than 75 percent of patients in the 
three developing countries were either without symptoms or at least functioning fairly well, only 35 
percent of the patients in the developed countries enjoyed a similar level of success.88
The distressing side-effects of neuroleptic medications were discussed by the Honourable Mr. 
Justice Robins in the Canadian case of Fleming v. Reid:  
 [T]he efficacy of the drugs is complicated by a number of serious side effects which are 
associated with their use. These include a number of muscular side effects known as 
extra-pyramidal reactions: dystonia (muscle spasms, particularly in the face and arms, 
irregular flexing, writhing or grimacing and protrusion of the tongue); akathesia (internal 
restlessness or agitation, an inability to sit still); akinesia (physical immobility and lack of 
spontaneity); and Parkinsonisms (mask-like facial expression, drooling, muscle stiffness, 
tremors, shuffling gait). The drugs can also cause a number of non-muscular side effects, 
such as blurred vision, dry mouth and throat, weight gain, dizziness, fainting, depression, 
low blood pressure and, less frequently, cardiovascular changes and, on occasion, sudden 
death. 
87 Id. at 173 - 174, 192, 201-202.
88 J. Leff, The International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia: Five-Year Follow-Up Findings 22 PSYCHOLOGICAL 
MED. 131 (1992); ROBERT WHITAKER, MAD IN AMERICA: BAD SCIENCE, BAD MEDICINE, AND THE 
ENDURING MISTREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL 227-228 (2002).  Whitaker, at 228-229, observes that 
this study was simply dismissed by Western psychiatrists and went unexplored given that it was “so threatening to 
Western medicine”.  
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The most potentially serious side effect of anti-psychotic drugs is a condition known as 
tardive dyskinesia. This is a generally irreversible neurological disorder characterized by 
involuntary, rhythmic and grotesque movement of the face, mouth, tongue, and jaw. The 
patient's extremities, neck, back and torso can also become involved. Tardive dyskinesia 
generally develops after prolonged use of the drugs, but it may appear after short term 
treatment and sometimes appears even after treatment has been discontinued.89
After surveying the scientific literature, the United States Supreme Court in Washington v.
Harper acknowledged that between 10 and 25 percent of all patients treated with antipsychotic 
medications display the symptoms of tardive dyskinesia.90  Further, the notion that newer neuroleptic 
medications possess therapeutic advantages over older medications is by no means undisputed.  Rather, it 
has been argued that there is no clear advantage to newer neuroleptic medications and that any perceived 
advantage is solely attributable to the fact that newer medications are less potent.91  Last, beyond the 
physiological repercussions, forced treatment with antipsychotic medications can have a more nuanced 
effect on the sense of self of persons diagnosed with mental disabilities: 
A particular treatment decision may be contrary to deeply held social, medical, political 
or religious values of a person with a mental disability.  Coerced treatment may violate an 
individual's sense of control over his or her life, health, and body.  When professionals 
override a person's decisions about health care, treatment or services, this may strip a 
person of a sense that he or she is respected by medical or other public authorities.  Once 
a person has been subjected to involuntary treatment in a mental health facility, he or she 
may never again feel safe or trusting of mental health or other government services.  A 
person who is going through a period of great mental anguish and need may be 
particularly sensitive to feelings of this kind.  While it may be hard to quantify the 
subjective feelings of humiliation and degradation caused by coercive treatment, there is 
no doubt that these feelings may be very intense.92
89 Fleming v. Reid (1991) 4 O.R. (3d) 74, 84 (Ont. C.A.).  See also Cohen, supra note 86, at 204 – 207 and J. 
Ballesteros, A. González–Pinto & A. Bulbena, Tardive Dyskinesia Associated with Higher Mortality in Psychiatric 
Patients: Results of a Meta-Analysis of Seven Independent Studies, 20:2 J. OF CLINICAL 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 188, 193 (2000).  For more on the harmful side-effects of antipsychotic neuroleptic 
medications see, generally, P. Breggin, Brain Damage Dementia and Persistent Cognitive Dysfunction Associated 
with Neuroleptic Drugs: Evidence, Etiology, Implications 11 J. MIND BEHAV. 425 (1990); PETER R. BREGGIN 
AND DAVID COHEN, YOUR DRUG MAY BE YOUR PROBLEM: HOW AND WHY TO STOP TAKING 
PSYCHIATRIC MEDICATIONS (1999); PETER R. BREGGIN, TOXIC PSYCHIATRY: WHY THERAPY, 
EMPATHY, AND LOVE MUST REPLACE THE DRUGS, ELECTROSHOCK, AND BIOCHEMICAL 
THEORIES OF THE “NEW PSYCHIATRY” (1994); Alexander Brooks, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic 
Medication: Law and Policy, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 339 (1987).
90 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 230 (1990).
91 D.C. Smith, Are Newer Antipsychotics Better?, 3:1 ETHICAL HUM. SCI. SERVICES:  INT’L J. CRITICAL 
INQUIRY 61 (2001).
92 Rosenthal and Sundram, supra note 10, at 524.  
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(iii) Forced Psychiatric Hospitalization
The proposed Convention should also limit forced psychiatric confinement to the rare situations 
where it can be clearly established that the individual, as a result of a mental disability, is either at risk of 
serious bodily harm to her/himself or others.  However, given that these rationales for commitment are 
often inaccurately applied and not adhered to, I advocate language that is in harmony with Article 5(4) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, which states that “Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by 
arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be 
decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”93  This sort of provision 
is particularly meaningful given that psychiatric review boards often deny those diagnosed with mental 
disabilities the benefit of procedural protections,94 thus falling victim to the medical model assertion that 
these safeguards “…can work against the best interests of patients”95 and that “…no benefit, to the 
patient, can be expected to result from challenging the validity of [an involuntary committal] certificate 
on a technicality.”96  Further, it is essential that a physician’s determination of “dangerousness” leading to 
a forced psychiatric admission should not result in the automatic finding that an individual is also 
incapable of consenting to treatment or managing finances, and thus an accompanying loss of further 
rights.97
93 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221.
94 In general, mental health jurisprudence has not evolved in a manner that affords the same level of procedural 
protection to individuals in the criminal justice systems.  As argued by one commentator in the Canadian context:  
“…courts have been overly reliant on a paternalistic model of mental health law and that such reliance has led to the 
under-development of procedural protections for individuals facing involuntary commitment.”  See I. Grant, Mental 
Health Law and the Courts, 29 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 747, 749 (1991).  
95 J.E. Gray, R.L. O’Reilly & G.W. Clements, Protecting the Rights of People with Mental Disabilities: Can we 
Achieve both Good Legal Process and Good Clinical Outcomes?, 23:2 HEALTH L. IN CANADA 25, 26 (2002).
96 Id. at 30.  For a refutation of this position, see Aaron A. Dhir, The Maelstrom of Civil Commitment in Ontario: 
Using Examinations Conducted During Periods of Unlawful Detention to Form the Basis of Subsequent Involuntary 
Detention under Ontario’s Mental Health Act, 24:2 HEALTH L. IN CANADA (2003).
97 For example, in the Canadian province of British Columbia, treatment is “deemed to be given with the consent of 
the patient” held involuntarily in a psychiatric facility.  See Mental Health Act, R.S.B.C. c. 288, s. 31(1) (1996).  
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(iv) Justiciability and Monitoring
The liberty interests at stake under the right to bodily and psychological integrity underscore the 
need for clear provisions on justiciability98 and a strong monitoring mechanism.  With respect to the 
former, the strongest statement currently exists in the ICCPR, which requires states to “develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy”.99   With regard to the Disability Rights Convention, stronger wording is 
preferable:  “[t]he rights guaranteed by the convention must give rise to enforceable remedies in national 
tribunals, and states must also accept an obligation to protect against violation of rights by non-
governmental agents.”100  This position was echoed by the Bangkok Recommendations, which state that 
“[t]here should be enforcement mechanisms, including provision of remedies, within institutional and/or 
judicial systems.”101
The Working Group did not have time to address the issue of an international monitoring 
mechanism for the potential Convention, which will thus be left for the Committee.  The type of 
mechanism which might be established should not only satisfy the desire to have strong follow-up, but 
also meet the concern of avoiding the counter-productive repetition of existing mechanisms (given that 
states will undoubtedly argue that further treaty obligations will create an unfair and unmanageable 
burden and that a Convention that overlaps with existing instruments will create confusion for states with 
respect to their obligations).
The proposed Convention will be the first to be negotiated after the current UN reform initiatives 
respecting treaty monitoring began.102  These reforms will consider, inter alia, the concept of a “core 
98 “[W]hether the courts can…provide a remedy for aggrieved individuals claiming a violation of those rights”.  
Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, 
MORALS, 275 (2nd ed. 2000).    
99 ICCPR, supra note 18 (Art. 2(3)(b)).
100 WNUSP SUBMISSION, supra note 58.  In British Columbia, instead of being afforded the right to challenge the 
“deemed consent” (referred to in footnote 97) before a court or tribunal, the patient is given only the opportunity to 
“request a second medical opinion on the appropriateness of the treatment authorized”.  It is notable that the second 
opinion relates only to the appropriateness of the treatment, not the administration of treatment itself.  See Mental 
Health Act, R.S.O. c. M.7, s. 31(2) (1990).
101 BANGKOK RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 63. 
102 Set against the backdrop of these reforms, it is possible that the eventual final text could be three to four years 
away.
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expanded document”, whereby states would be required to submit one comprehensive report that speaks 
to the state’s core obligations under all relevant human rights treaties.  Though the single-report 
suggestion will likely be resisted by most states (preferring instead a more fragmented approach) and 
Committee members themselves (who have a vested interested in maintaining the status quo), this
initiative should be regarded as a positive step in human rights monitoring as it would result in the public 
placing a heightened level of importance on the report, forcing states to take such reports more seriously. 
International instruments currently contain two primary mechanisms to monitor government
compliance:  state reporting and individual complaints.  In the event that the idea of a “core expanded 
document” does not find favor, one alternative to the present treaty monitoring body system would be to 
set-up an Ombudsperson’s office to receive and investigate complaints arising from the Convention.103
Indeed, if we view human rights monitoring broadly, to include “…observing events, visiting sites and 
holding discussions with government authorities to obtain information and to pursue remedies”,104
arguably, an Ombudsperson is in a much better position to fulfill these tasks than a treaty-based 
committee.  With respect to economic, social and cultural rights, an Ombudsperson’s office could also 
undertake budget analysis and track statistics in order to monitor state compliance.105  However, even 
with an Ombudsperson, there would be reason to remain skeptical given that generally “their remedial 
powers are usually recommendatory rather than binding, and their ability to effect compliance rests 
103 “Several international organizations have successfully established ombudspersons.  The EU, for example, has 
created an Ombudsman who has over the years established himself as an indispensable feature of EU governance.”  
See Florian Hoffmann & Frédéric Mégret, Fostering Human Rights Accountability: An Ombudsperson for the 
United Nations?, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (forthcoming 2004).
104 Disability Rights Promotion International, PHASE I REPORT: OPPORTUNITIES, METHODOLOGIES, AND 
TRAINING RESOURCES FOR DISABILITY RIGHTS MONITORING 27 (October 2003). 
105 Obviously, such an undertaking need not be limited to the work of an Ombudsperson.  For a discussion on the 
use of budget analysis in general, see Jim Shultz, Promises to Keep: Using Public Budgets as a Tool to Advance 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2002), available at 
http://www.internationalbudget.org/themes/ESC/FullReport.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).  UNIFEM’s “Gender 
Responsive Budget Analysis” is illustrative of how budgets may be studied to focus on the rights of particular 
vulnerable groups.  See What is Gender Responsive Budget Analysis?, available at 
http://www.unifem.org/index.php?f_page_pid=19 (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).  In fact, at the Working Group 
Meeting, Lebanon argued that states should be obliged to prepare their national budgets with their Convention 
obligations in mind.
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primarily on the publicity of their reports, rather than on formal prosecutorial competences.”106  For 
example, while the “Swedish Disability Ombudsman” has the power to receive, examine and investigate 
reports from persons alleging that they have been excluded or discriminated against on the grounds of 
disability, with respect to ensuring compliance, he is particularly impotent:  “[He] may contact other 
authorities, businesses or organisations in order to achieve an improvement for people with disability.  If 
the matter involves inadequacies in current legislation…[he] can draw the attention of the Government to 
this.”107  Thus, it is perhaps best to conceive of the Ombudsperson as working alongside the committee 
structure, rather than acting as a substitute.   
Most radical, however, is the draft Convention produced by Professor Scheinin of Åbo Akademi 
University’s Institute for Human Rights (Finland).  Scheinin’s draft omits any mention of a new 
committee for the proposed Convention.  Instead, it proposes a disability Ombudsperson who would 
represent claimants in submitting communications under the existing treaties that allow for petitions (i.e. 
CERD, ICCPR and CEDAW).108  This is a fascinating suggestion that is worthy of consideration during 
the Committee’s deliberations.  Indeed, the position of this paper is that existing Convention-based rights 
have direct relevance to those diagnosed with disabilities, but that oversight bodies systemically ignore 
disability-related issues.  The establishment of an Ombudsperson to represent claimants has the potential 
of remedying this problem, while at the same time helping to avoid the counter-productive repetition of 
existing mechanisms.
If a more traditional committee structure is established, it must be part of a strong monitoring 
framework “to gauge the levels of implementation and provide guidance on best practices.  This 
monitoring mechanism should be empowered to engage all relevant levels, including states, 
106 Hoffmann & Mégret, supra note 103.
107 See http://www.ho.se/start.asp?lang=en&sida=996 (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).  
108 DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE FULL ENJOYMENT OF ALL HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS BY PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, Arts. 9 – 10, available at
http://www.abo.fi/instut/imr/research/Scheinin_draft_convention.doc (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).  
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intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and individuals.”109  The monitoring 
body should be empowered not only to accept and evaluate mandatory reports, but also to hear complaint 
petitions from individuals and NGOs and conduct its own investigations into alleged breaches of the 
Convention.  Admittedly, and in harmony with my comments above respecting the need to remain 
mindful of the relationship between the ideal and the real, the establishment of a right to petition may 
have to come in the form of an Optional Protocol, especially given that the proposed Convention will 
include not only civil and political rights, but economic and social rights as well.110  Perhaps even more 
important than providing a sort of mechanism by which to seek a “remedy”, a complaint procedure would 
hopefully result in a line of jurisprudence from the oversight committee that would provide a coherent set 
of principles which would inform the interpretation of the proposed Convention.  Last, it is essential that 
the committee assigned the monitoring role be composed of human rights experts,111 and include those 
with disabilities.  In this regard, article 7 of the Kallehauge Draft reads as follows:
.…there shall be established a Committee on the Rights of Persons with  Disabilities, 
which shall carry out the function hereinafter provided. 
The Committee shall consist of 12 disability experts of high moral standing and 
recognised competence. The members of the committee shall be elected by the States 
Parties from among their most prominent national leaders of organisations of disabled 
persons, scholars and scientists and shall serve in their personal capacity, consideration 
being given to gender and equitable geographical distribution as well as to various kinds 
of impairment.112
109 DISABLED PEOPLES' INTERNATIONAL, POSITION PAPER REGARDING A NEW INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION FOR DISABLED PEOPLE, (2003) available at
http://www.dpi.org/en/resources/pdfs/03-04-09-1_Position_Paper_Draft3.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2003).
110 The Working Group on the draft Optional Protocol to the ICESCR is scheduled to have its first meeting 
beginning on February 23, 2004.  In fact, it was argued almost a decade ago “…that the time is ripe for a 
fundamental change of policy” regarding the position that economic, social and cultural rights are not appropriate 
for an individual complaints procedure.  See Philip Alston, Establishing a Right to Petition Under the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW, 
Vol. IV, Book 2, 107, 115 (1995).
111 As discussed by Bodansky with respect to reporting obligations in environmental regimes, the use of an ad hoc 
team of experts rather than a single commission or committee could allow for more in-depth review.  See Daniel 
Bodansky, Reporting Obligations in Environmental Regimes: Lessons for Human Rights Supervision, in THE 
FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 361 (Philip Alston and J. Crawford, eds., 2000).
111 Quinn and Degener, supra note 28 at 297.  
112 DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, 
available at http://www.dpi.org/en/resources/topics/convention/06-13-03_Denmark_Draft.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 
2003) [emphasis added].  There is no reason why the idea of representation of disabled persons on the monitoring 
body should not be equally applicable to national tribunals that govern decisions relating to disability.  In Ontario, 
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VI. Conclusion
Though there are detailed international human rights mechanisms that are applicable to persons 
with mental disabilities, in practice these persons face major impediments to protections respecting the 
sanctity of bodily and psychic integrity.  They are subjected to discrimination and degrading abuses of 
their rights on a daily basis.  
A disability-specific Convention would serve to fill a glaring omission in the international 
framework, in addition to providing beneficial effects via the very treaty-making process itself.  However, 
in order to reach its full potential, any such Convention must reject the traditional medical-model of 
disability and adopt a reformulation of disability as a social construct, thus reflecting a rights-based 
paradigm.  While the social theory of disability has been widely accepted in respect of other forms of 
disability, the medical-model still governs mental disability.  While the complete prohibition on forced 
treatment and committal advocated by particular NGOs is unrealistic, certain provisions/principles will 
ensure that the proposed Convention promotes a rights-based model.  Namely, forced treatment 
interventions should be limited to the rarest of occasions and incapacity findings should recognize varying 
degrees of capacity.  Previously expressed wishes regarding treatment must be respected and individuals 
who are the subject of forced treatment should be provided with alternatives to antipsychotic medications.  
It should not be presumed that chemical treatment modalities represent the only viable path.  
The proposed Convention should also limit forced psychiatric confinement to the rare situations 
where it can be clearly established that the individual, as a result of a mental disability, is either at risk of 
serious bodily harm to her/himself or others.  Individuals subjected to such detention should have the 
right to administrative or judicial review in a timely manner.  Further, a physician’s determination of 
Canada, the Consent and Capacity Board (“the Board”) typically sits as a panel of three (one lawyer member, one 
psychiatrist member and one lay member).  There is no requirement that persons with disabilities be represented.  
While some may argue that the composition of an administrative review tribunal should reflect the principle of 
neutrality, the presence of a psychiatrist member demonstrates that the Board should also reflect a degree of 
expertise.  Indeed, the expertise of the Board is a factor that courts rely on in giving deference to Board decisions on 
appeal.  See I.T. v. L.L. (a.k.a. C.) and T.C . (1999) 46 O.R. (3d) 284 (Ont. C.A.).  It should also be noted that while 
lawyer members of the Board are permitted to sit alone, there is no statutory requirement that they have experience 
before the Board prior to their appointments, or that they practice in the fields of administrative law or any form of 
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“dangerousness” leading to a forced psychiatric admission should not result in the automatic finding that 
an individual is also incapable of consenting to treatment or managing finances, and thus an 
accompanying loss of further rights.  These key provisions, and this article’s recommendations respecting 
monitoring and the link between the failure to reasonably accommodate and discrimination, should not be 
sacrificed by drafters, lest any future Convention be rendered a hollow mechanism that serves only to 
perpetuate the problems it seeks to ameliorate.  
litigation.  Thus, lawyer members sitting alone need not have any experience or training in tribunal procedure or 
evidence.  See Health Care Consent Act, 1996, S.O. c. 2, Sch. A, ss. 73(2) (1996).
